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Abstract—Current Security Pattern evaluation techniques are
demonstrated to be incomplete with respect to quantitative
measurement and comparison. A proposal for a dynamic testbed
system is presented as a potential mechanism for evaluating
patterns within a constrained environment
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I. INTRODUCTION
Patterns have been used in the academic community but
there has been little take up within industry due to a lack of
standardisation or access. Many authors have discussed what
patterns are, how they are classified and offered guidelines
as to their definition, storage and usage [1-2]. However, there
are issues of evaluation of the patterns relying on validation
through usage and feedback from users. Halkidis [1] evaluates
patterns according to quality criteria and Microsofts STRIDE
mnemonic in an attempt to find weakest links and to allow
a system to fail securely. Halkidis noted the need to ensure
patterns are well analysed and tested. However, this raises the
question of how well tested an abstract pattern can be deter-
mined and, in parallel, what a well formed pattern actually is.
Essentially we are concerned with the assurance that patterns
are defined in such a way that erroneous variation is minimised,
if not removed, and that any stored, publicly available pattern
has been evaluated to a level that enables trust in that pattern.
We argue it is not sufficient to accept pattern publication
and written, non-metricised, comments stating that testing has
occurred. Essentially, an absence of well formed and applied
evaluation procedures is not sufficient evidence of a useable
pattern. Positive feedback alone can give rise to unwarranted
satisfaction and negative feedback is often ignored.
II. SECURITY LIFE-CYCLE
Fernandez [2,3] has noted the need for a Security De-
velopment Life-Cycle. By using domain analysis followed by
rigorous analysis and design, a pattern can be developed from
concept through to implementation and classified at a layer of
architectural abstraction. Heyman [4] has indicated the use of
metrics to localise weaknesses (e.g. design or requirement led
metrics) and by using misuse cases, it can be demonstrated that
some types of attacks can be theoretically minimised by use of
the stored pattern. However, an issue again arises from pattern
theory. Forces (and consequences) are trade-offs necessary to
design and build pattern implementations. A user can therefore
radically change a pattern or its code depending on what forces
are considered more important than others; the pattern may be
decomposed in different ways and no want of guidelines and
best practice will indicate verification and validation of the
result. Essentially changing a pattern, even at a microscopic
level, can have multiple ripple effects throughout the forces,
the cohesive group of linked patterns and associated tests and
consequences.
III. CURRENT EVALUATION METHODS
Current techniques for evaluating a pattern include shep-
herding and walkthroughs, the equivalent of a Capability Matu-
rity Model quality approach. Some qualitative and quantitative
metrics have been noted by some authors [5-6] but more work
is needed on quantitative metrics that take account of deltas,
forces and consequences. Work on architecture and model
checking may be appropriate at the design stages and many
authors have noted the use of UMLSec, OCL etc for examining
consequences. Essentially this work can lead to separation of
concerns and aspect oriented design rules being applied to
pattern design. Ease of use is often measured by either the
lines of text accompanying a pattern or by its Flesch-Kincaid
value. Both have an impact onto pattern extraction ability or
requirements as developers naturally require descriptions to
search on unless and until a pattern language is defined which
mitigates these issues.
IV. COSTS OF COMPLEXITY
The complexity of a pattern, and its sub-system, is also an
important, and often over-looked area of concern. Complexity
as a metric is often described as Lines of Code, Depth of
Inheritance, FanIn and FanOut (the coupling of modules to
other modules). More in-depth complexity measures come
from the complexity of the logic in predicates (the number of
hidden paths), each of which can give rise to a separate flow,
implementation or weakness. Essentially we should measure
the amount of noise around a pattern wherein variations of
a true, or good pattern, exhibit untoward risks. By enabling
a reduction or a constraint in the genericity of a pattern to
reduce its noise we can perhaps guide its user towards a
cleaner implementation. All of these measures require both
static and dynamic measurements of a pattern and its close
neighbourhood, a lot of effort should be expended a priori
but the benefit will be truly useable patterns where the causes
and effects are known to within limitations. To misquote Clint
Eastwood as Dirty Harry, ”a good pattern should know its
limitations”.
For example, a pattern may connect to several other pat-
terns (its FanOut) and a smaller number may use it (its FanIn).
These connections will build up pathways between the code
generated by the pattern templates and one could elicit test
cases from the logic or the flow of these pathways. FIFO, FanIn
times FanOut gives, allegedly, a measure of the complexity of
the code, but in actual fact it is not a clear measure because
of the predicates and logical structures (such as loops and
decisions) within that code. To state that one has tested code by
checking N paths equivalent to FIFO is to not understand that
code carries a payload of data and logic. However, however
crudely, a large FIFO indicates a larger test space and therefore
a larger evaluation space.
Similarly, if the pattern indicates data usage there will be
test indicators with respect to data structure size, parameter
passing and even types. To a tester, a large data set implies a
variety of stress tests forcing the boundaries of the number
storage, arithmetic manipulations and the storage structure
itself. Hence, to indicate complexity of a pattern, and the code
derived thereof, is not a simple count of lines of pattern written
or the number of predicates or the number of links. However,
there is no doubt a sweet point between little effort to gain a
rough guideline of complexity and much effort to get accuracy.
What we desire is to be able to indicate that a pattern, or a
group of patterns, is more complex than another and therefore
indicative of higher testing and evaluation costs.
V. A DYNAMIC TESTBED FOR PATTERN EVALUATION
Modern software development life-cycles indicate rapid
development, pair programming and mini cycles encourag-
ing a small team of developers to implement code in short
cycle bursts. Security life-cycles are not known for rapid
development production cycles (and perhaps never should
be) but interest should be taken in the prototyping methods
of short burst and evaluation cycles demonstrating that a
design or an implementation is both validated and verified
within the confines of the tests applied. Further, benefit can
be gained from continuous integration testing using previous
(regression)and new test cases to an implementation. Testing
and evaluating security vulnerabilities has to be a continual and
adaptable process of iterative test cycles. The ripple effect of
minor changes in design and implementation can be measured
and minimised by this technique. A continuous development
approach can indicate weaknesses more quickly in the system
under test.
Using mini-cycles of pattern design and development cou-
pled with prototyping variants of the pattern implementation
will allow a repository of patterns to be built, complete with
test cases and a history of both positive and negative feedback,
usage and metrics. However, this implies that one person or
organisation develops a single pattern in a single development
and this is not necessarily the case. It is proposed to link a
repository of patterns to a test harness, a virtualised environ-
ment allowing an instantiated pattern (and its variants) to be
executed with a series of weaknesses known from the CAPEC,
CVE or NVD databases, instantiated through metasploit.
Quantitative measurements of the forces, the pattern FiFo
coupling metric and the testing results will allow a score to be
derived for each pattern. Essentially this will be a dynamic
form of stress testing a pattern but will allow a series of
quantitative measures of the pattern to be stored alongside the
qualitative quality metrics as defined by other authors. Driving
the quantitative measurements would be a series of questions
derived to assess the pattern and its implementation; a) How
complex is the solution? How many components, connections,
variables etc are measured to describe the mass of the pattern
and program? b) How well-tempered is the pattern? Is it
complete, wellformed, has it been through a model checker?
c) What is the ease-of-use of the pattern? Is it readable, usable,
are example codes given, are limitations described? d) Is there
a feedback loop that incorporates changes (deltas), test cases,
integration information as well as comments? These questions
are meant to find out the goodness of fit of the pattern.
The dynamic pattern testbed requires several years of
research and implementation if it is to succeed, but only a
quantitative and dynamic approach to pattern development and
implementation would allow patterns to leave the confines of
the pattern researchers and be acceptable to system developers.
However, our current theory has been led by two strands of
work, pattern language development [7] and security testing
[8]. By developing a logically robust language to describe
patterns, generated patterns would have a rigorous description
that would elicit code, logic and even data parameters in
a consistent way. An integration testing tool, such as are
available for code testing, could be built to work either at
the design level indicating incoherent flows, or at the code
level to detect contentions. Both static abstract patterns and the
generated code can be measured via basic code and complexity
metrics. The expectation is that trials would indicate warning
(amber) metrics wherein the pattern will not generate well
formed code (by a variety of programmers) or that it is
not integrating robustly with connecting patterns (and code).
Essentially this work proposes to merge known code testing
and evaluation techniques with the higher level thinking skills
involved in pattern writing to indicate pattern reliability and
code-worthiness. With measures of the usefulness of patterns
and their code genericity soundness, it is more likely that
pattern uptake will occur in the security domain.
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